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PREFACE 
 
The prevalent issue of wrongful conviction in our nation is one that requires both Politics and 
Philosophy in order to wade through and decide how we should tackle it. Having been fortunate 
enough to come into contact with people both in prison and out on parole these past four years, I 
have spoken face to face with those who the US criminal justice system fails the most. However, 
people who have committed crimes are not the only people who are harmed by the criminal 
justice system because as it turns out, many innocent people have been and currently are being 
punished for crimes that they had no participation in. These people who have been proven 
innocent after having served a mistaken punishment deserve just compensation for the wrong 
that they suffered. This thesis seeks to explore how society can and should compensate those 
who have been wrongfully convicted after they are exonerated and how we can prevent these 
mistakes from happening to others in the future. I hope that my reader will consider the odd 
phenomenon of wrongful conviction in conjunction with how it plays into the broken justice 
system as a whole.
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Introduction 
 
 
There is growing evidence that the dramatic rise in the number of people being 
sent to prison has also resulted in an extraordinary increase in the number of 
wrongful convictions, illegal sentences, and unjust imprisonments. Rather than 
expand and facilitate increased review of larger numbers of prisoner appeals, 
lawmakers and state and federal courts have sought to dismantle collateral appeal 
mechanisms, bar substantive remedies for constitutional violations, and restrict 
review of federal habeas corpus applications.1 
 
While numerous authors like Bryan Stevenson have pointed out the growing danger of 
wrongful convictions, I have been drawn to study this issue through personal experiences such as 
working with and getting to know female parolees in the Crossroads Inc. halfway program and 
sharing education with prisoners as fellow students at the California Rehabilitation Center in 
Norco. Experiences like these have led me to explore the justice system, and while I know that 
many of the people I have met committed desperate acts (I will never forget my feelings the first 
time one of the parolees told me she had killed her husband), I have also come to know that the 
possibility of them being innocent yet imprisoned is far greater than I imagined. This thesis 
focuses on issues associated with wrongful conviction and compensation for those who, despite 
their innocence, have been wrongly incarcerated. I explore the topic of exonerees in both a 
philosophical and political context in order to address longstanding debates that have arisen from 
the fact that the U.S. criminal justice system, like any other, is imperfect. 
Two years ago when I started this work with Professor Green, we were baffled by the lack 
of discussion surrounding such clear miscarriages of justice. Since then, as I have learned more 
about these cases, so too, it seems, has the country. Erroneous convictions have become a topic 
in multiple outlets, from stories on National Public Radio and articles in the New York Times, to 
pop-culture shows such as the “This American Life” podcast, Serial: Season One, the Netflix 
original series, Making a Murderer, and HBO’s The Jinx. This phenomenon is not completely 
new with shows in the past featuring innocent convictions, including TV shows such as “In 
                                                
1 Bryan Stevenson, “Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases,” Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 41 (2006): 1. 
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Justice” and “Perry Mason,” the novels of Scott Turow, and the hit play “The Exonerated”.2 
Nevertheless, the awareness of this issue seems to have greatly risen, culminating in current 
Presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders making reform of the criminal justice 
system a major campaign issue. 
This attention has helped the American people see how arbitrary, inequitable, and at times, 
flat out wrong our criminal justice system can be, however, while locking innocent people up 
appears to be a clear-cut case of injustice, like most issues there are multiple sides, especially 
when it comes to (1) improving the criminal system to reduce the likelihood of these wrongs and 
(2) providing compensation when these wrongs are uncovered. Conservative politicians, judges, 
and scholars have openly stated that they do not see wrongful conviction as an urgent problem 
that needs solving. No one desires the wrongful conviction of innocent Americans; however, 
tough-on-crime policies can lead people to oppose solutions that might otherwise seem to be a 
simple case of addressing wrongs. And there are deeper questions of political philosophy 
concerning the obligations between citizen and state in the context of imperfect governmental 
systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Joshua Marquis, “The Innocent and the Shammed,” The New York Times, January 26, 2006. 
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Overview 
 
This thesis focuses on three questions: (1) How sizable is the problem of innocent 
individuals being convicted of and imprisoned for crimes they did not commit? (2) What can be 
changed within the criminal justice system to minimize the risk of this occurring? (3) When it 
does occur, what is the appropriate compensation for those who have been wrongly imprisoned?  
I begin by addressing the question of the size and nature of these issues. Multiple 
estimations have been made and I seek to weigh the best ones. I base this analysis on reputable 
data, looking at estimates that have been publicly used within the legal, judicial and criminal 
justice communities to quantify wrongful conviction in the United States. I include the reactions 
of experts in the innocence field to these data and analyze how plausible the numbers themselves 
are and the methodologies that derived them. By almost any measure, the problem is huge.  
In addition, I explore whether the risk of being mistaken as guilty is an equal burden that 
every American citizen shares or if the risk is disproportionate by race and other factors. And if 
this is so, what are the implications for improving the criminal justice system and for 
determining appropriate compensation? 
Next, I take a philosophical look at how the relationship between the American people and 
the criminal justice system affects our perspectives on this issue. In short: Is compensating the 
wrongfully convicted a tax that society should pay for having an imperfect criminal justice 
system or is the possibility of being wrongfully convicted a risk that each member must take to 
be a part of society? There are arguments on both sides, and the answer to these questions is not 
simply one side or the other. Ultimately I argue that while we all run a risk of being punished for 
not having done anything wrong (whether this risk is equal or not), when this occurs society 
owes us compensation, just as the government comes to the aid of people who are harmed 
through no cause of their own by providing assistance that includes disaster relief, social safety 
net payments and victim’s compensation. 
Having argued that society is responsible for providing some form of compensation to 
those who it wrongly punishes, I discuss the intricacies of compensation in order to decide what 
an appropriate level of compensation would look like for innocent exonerees. I also address 
issues such as the lack of uniformity in the amounts and policies associated with compensation 
by both Federal policies and state-by-state ones. Should there be a single compensation solution 
 12 
or does it require localized variations? In this section I also explore which policies, currently 
practiced by various states, actually serve individuals and society best by making amends for the 
mistake. In order to keep this exploration realistic, I include an examination of the costs and 
benefits of compensation to society.  
The final section discusses the way forward and how everything that I have discussed can 
be applied towards taking appropriate action in the future. I review the action and 
implementation that has already been taken, and explore the considerable work that remains. 
Many of these issues are extremely difficult and there are competing goals that need to be 
resolved, but in the end it is critical to address the needs of those who, for no fault of their own, 
have suffered at the hands of the criminal justice system. 
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I.  The Size and Significance of the Problem 
 
Before analyzing previous work on the size and significance of wrongful conviction within the 
U.S. criminal justice system, it is first necessary to clarify the key concepts and scope of the 
issue. 
Definitions and Scope of the Problem 
The population of interest for this thesis is generally called exonerees. The term exoneree 
refers to a person who was convicted of a crime that she or he did not commit and was later 
proven to be innocent and, thus, exonerated. These individuals are known to be ‘factually 
innocent,’ distinguishing them from others who might be deemed innocent for other reasons such 
as a mistrial or other legal misconduct. An exonoree is also distinct from someone who was 
pardoned by the President or a governor for a crime that he or she committed (although 
sometimes innocent people are pardoned) because an exoneree had no part in the crime that they 
were accused, convicted and charged for. In other words, this thesis does not address cases where 
the individual convicted a crime, but arguably should not have been held guilty for reasons such 
as personal defense cases where a wife killed an abusive husband. Even though these cases are 
also important to consider, they are outside my scope.  
Given this precise scope, recent advances in technology are especially important for 
defining true innocence. Technology such as DNA testing, which began to be used in the 1980s, 
allows us to know for almost certain whether an innocent person was mistaken for the actual 
perpetrator. These innocent people or exonerees have been incarcerated for any number of years 
and subsequently found to be innocent through post-conviction DNA testing or other additional 
evidence such as outside confessions or proof of alibi for example. 
 
Size – How many innocents are still behind bars? 
What is the best estimate of the number of people in U.S. prisons who should be 
exonerated? What is the nature of the system’s mistakes that have put them there? Unfortunately, 
these are not simple questions. The hardest evidence of innocence that we have, DNA analysis, is 
only available in cases where there is DNA evidence, such as rape. There are problems with 
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trying to generalize the percentage of wrongful convictions in this subset of crimes to the entire 
criminal justice system.  
The first problem is that most rape cases include eye witness testimony or identification 
through lineups which are a main cause of wrongful conviction due to their inaccuracies. 
Scholars have shown that eyewitness testimony is one of the most unreliable sources of evidence 
(Garrett 2015; Gould 2010). If a rape case defendant is more likely to be wrongfully convicted 
than a defendant in another type of case, projecting the data that we have on DNA exonerations 
would overestimate the total error rate.  
However, rape cases are not the only cases that use eye witness testimony and 
identification, nor is eye witness testimony the only source of error. In fact, all types of cases can 
involve proven inaccuracies that come in many forms such as: overly aggressive interrogations, 
false informants, false confessions due to threats of the death penalty or for other reasons, 
prosecutorial misconduct and racial bias among others.3 Given all these sources of error, it is 
possible that using the data that we currently have from DNA exonerations would underestimate 
the total error rate in the US. This is because despite the proven unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony, these numerous other sources of wrongful conviction are likely to impact non-rape 
cases without the DNA evidence to exonerate those wrongly convicted. 
Organizations active on the exoneree issue are overloaded and underfunded, focusing more 
on finding and exonerating innocent people than on research to pin down the size of the problem. 
Even so, the number of exonerees is informative with more and more individuals exonerated 
each week. 2015 was a record year of exonerations with 149 in total compared to 139 in 20144 
and 87 in 20135, according to the National Registry of Exonerations, a registry put together by 
the University of Michigan Law School. This increase probably shows that DNA evidence has 
become an increasingly effective mechanism for diagnosing our country’s erroneous conviction 
“disease;” yet, the data is unable to tell us whether the prevalence of the disease is increasing or 
decreasing. We only know that we are better at diagnosing it. Given the complex nature of 
wrongful conviction and exoneration, we may never have a definitive count of the cases and 
                                                
3 Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, "One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions after a Century of Research," Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology 100.3 (2010): 841. 
4 “Exonerations in 2015,” University of Michigan, last modified February 3, 2016, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf 
5 “Exonerations in 2015.” 
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thus, we will not know whether we are doing a better job of preventing it from happening in the 
first place or whether the problem is getting worse. 
Another issue with projecting the limited data we have available onto the entire criminal 
justice system surrounds death penalty cases. Much of the data on exonerations is acquired from 
capital punishment cases since these cases undergo the appeals process more than any other type 
of case. Given this high degree of scrutiny, capital punishment cases might seem like a good 
sample dataset to model what the total rate of false conviction would be if all cases were to 
undergo a similarly extensive appeals process. However, the death penalty is also a contentious 
and highly debated topic in our nation. Defendants pursuing habeas corpus relief, generally 
based on procedural rather than evidential grounds, often make their way up to the Supreme 
Court. The Court has acknowledged that wrongful convictions happen; however, in 2015 former 
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred with the Court in Glossip v. Gross writing that: 
The reality is that any innocent defendant is infinitely better off appealing a death 
sentence than a sentence of life imprisonment. (Which, again, Justice Breyer 
acknowledges: “[C]ourts (or State Governors) are 130 times more likely to 
exonerate a defendant where a death sentence is at issue,” post, at 5.) The capital 
convict will obtain endless legal assistance from the abolition lobby (and legal 
favoritism from abolitionist judges), while the lifer languishes unnoticed behind 
bars.6 
 
This is to say that there exists an inherent bias in capital punishment cases because we would 
prefer to incarcerate a person for life over putting them to death (a final, irreversible act) if there 
is an inkling of doubt in their case. This is an odd argument however because it turns out that 
putting someone in life for prison is also nearly irreversible given our criminal justice system. 
Even so, Justice Scalia was right—there are obviously strong reasons to appeal the death penalty 
and therefore using capital punishment cases as a sample size brings many exonerations into the 
equation that go beyond our initial definition of exoneree, and therefore could over predict the 
total number of wrongful convictions in the country. 
It is clear that there are many challenges to estimating the rate at which wrongful 
convictions occur in the US criminal justice system. The total number of unknown innocents 
who are currently behind bars will continue to remain unknown. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this has 
not deterred many scholars from trying to make estimations. These estimations are valuable 
                                                
6 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. (2015) 
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because while they are not certain, they are backed by immense research and statistical analysis 
and can help us to measure future progress. Additionally, many of these estimations are 
shockingly high and thus, should influence more action to be taken to stop future false 
convictions from happening. As Gould and Leo wrote in their 2010 article which analyzed 100 
years of research on wrongful conviction research, “whatever the correct figure, wrong 
convictions are far from rare in the criminal justice system.”7 Zalman, Smith and Kiger (2008) 
call this an issue of “intrinsic importance—as a matter of justice and as a gateway to exposing 
over looked deficiencies in the criminal justice process—makes knowledge about the scope of 
the problem desirable.”8 
 The following section reviews historical efforts to estimate the scope of this issue of 
“intrinsic importance.” 
 
Historical Efforts to Estimate the Scope of the Problem 
i. Borchard 
Before DNA was a developed technology that could be used to prove or disprove a 
person’s innocence, there was still recognition that the criminal justice system could be wrong 
from time to time as well as discussion about what should be done. One of the first major works 
written about the philosophical and political problem of wrongful conviction was published in 
1932 by a Law Professor at Yale University named Edwin M. Borchard.9 While Borchard does 
not discuss or even estimate how many people might be wrongly convicted, he does question 
whether there are people who have been or who were currently being punished for a crime that 
they did not commit. Borchard’s piece titled Convicting the Innocent analyzes how other, 
primarily European, countries respond when they realize that their legal system has allowed the 
wrong person to face punishment. Despite the non-existence of DNA evidence, countries around 
the world including certain US states possessed statutes that outlined details such as protocol, 
eligibility and compensation requirements for exonerees. This shows that it was well known, 
                                                
7 Gould & Leo, "One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions after a Century of Research," 827. 
8 Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith & Angie Kiger, “Officials' Estimates of the Incidence of ‘Actual Innocence’ Convictions,’ Justice 
Quarterly, 25 (2008): 73. 
9 Edwin Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), 375-414. 
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long before DNA technology sprung up, that the legal system is imperfect—that there are people 
in every prison system around the world who are innocent. 
Most relevant here is Borchard's discussion of the philosophy behind why the State should 
aim to balance their system’s imperfections by indemnifying those who have been mistakenly 
punished. He presents three theories that people who oppose creating legislation and allocating 
resources toward finding and compensating the wrongly convicted still use to ground their 
argument today. In short, these arguments are: (1) that the State cannot be held accountable for 
the hardships that particular individuals have to suffer when it is exercising its “sovereign 
right,”10 (2) if the State is acting lawfully it cannot injure anyone,11 and perhaps the strongest of 
the three, that (3) there can be no liability if there is not fault.12 Borchard countered these 
arguments to verify the importance of rectifying a criminal justice system as thoroughly as 
possible. I return to Borchard and these arguments in section five on the issue of compensation. 
Following Borchard, many other scholars have delved into this problem. In 1992, Radelet, 
Bedau and Putnam published In Spite of Innocence, a book that consolidated stories from 416 
cases they had accumulated over their 30 years of research. These researchers identified that in 
all 416 cases “the wrong person was convicted.”13 These cases took place in all but the last 
decade of the 20th Century.14 Like Borchard, the cases that these authors examined did not have 
the luxury of DNA technology.15 However, they correctly recognized that, “[t]he errors, 
blunders, and tragedies recounted in the pages of this book barely scratch the surface of this vast 
output of the nation’s criminal justice system.”16 
 
ii. The Innocence Project 
The same year that Radelet, Bedau and Putnam published their book, Barry C. Scheck and 
Peter J. Neufeld founded the Innocence Project, an NGO created as an external overseer of the 
                                                
10 Borchard, Convicting the Innocent, 388. 
11 Borchard, Convicting the Innocent, 389. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Michael L. Radelet, Hugo Adam Bedau and Constance E. Putman, In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital 
Cases (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1994), 17. 
14 Radelet, Bedau and Putnam, In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital Cases, ix-x. 
15 The first person convicted by DNA evidence was Tommie Lee Andrews in 1987. (Randy James, “A Brief History of DNA 
Testing,” Time Magazine, June 19 2009.) 
16 Radelet, Bedau and Putnam, In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital Cases, 17. 
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innocent. Working primarily with DNA technology, this organization has worked to combat the 
errors that occur beneath the criminal justice system’s surface. Given this effort, the Innocence 
Project is generally seen as the most reliable estimate of proven U.S. exonerees. According to the 
Innocence Project, as of February 2016, 337 innocent people who served time in prison have 
been exonerated. 
The Innocence Project works to exonerate wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA 
testing and reforming the criminal justice system in order to prevent these injustices from 
happening in the first place. It achieves this through litigation and public policy work across the 
nation. The Innocence Project has positively impacted the political conversations surrounding 
prison reform and wrongful conviction, but they feel that they are unable to leave this work in 
the government’s hands. As they state: “These DNA exoneration cases have provided irrefutable 
proof that wrongful convictions are not isolated or rare events, but arise from systematic defects 
that can be precisely identified and addressed. For more than 15 years, the Innocence Project has 
worked to pinpoint these trends [emphasis added].”17 
While the Innocence Project is an important player, they are not the only ones who have 
recognized and made a concerted effort to understand and mitigate this problem. 
 
iii. Considering the Data – Our Best Guess 
There are considerable data describing various aspects of the U.S. criminal justice system. 
We have statistics on incarceration rates by race (at the end of 2014 black males made up 37% 
and Hispanic made make up 22% of the prison population18), location (as of 2014, Texas and 
California had the highest prison populations in the country19), and offense (at the end of 2014, 
53.2% of all people in prison sentenced under state jurisdiction were convicted of violent 
crimes20) as well as rates of recidivism (at the beginning of 2014, 61% of people who had been 
released within three years had returned to prison in California21) and length of sentence (the 
nationwide average incarceration sentence length from October 2011 to September 2012 was 
                                                
17 “DNA Exonerations Nationwide,” The Innocence Project, accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-
innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide. 
18 Ann Carson, “Prisoners in 2014,” Bureau of Justice Statistics (September 2015): 15. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “2013 Outcome Evaluation Report,” (January 2014): 12. 
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54.9 months22). However, we do not have solid data on incorrect convictions despite our 
knowledge that mistakes happen on a seemingly systematic basis. We know that in total between 
1989 and March 2nd, 2016, 1,746 people had been exonerated total23 and that from 1992 to 
present, 337 people have been exonerated with DNA,24 but we can’t help but ask: Are there 
more?  What is the rate of wrongful convictions in the U.S.? 
The numbers just cited do not tell us how many people are currently serving time for a 
crime that they did not commit. The fact that we cannot definitively know this figure has added a 
factor of mystery and fear to the exoneree issue. This fear, combined with limited data and 
personal stories from exonerees, has already led to some state and federal government action 
(e.g. the National Summit on Wrongful Convictions in 201325). Nevertheless, having better data 
and estimates as to the extent of the problem is important to future political and judicial action. 
The current data (and personal accounts) confirm that the error rate of wrongful conviction 
in the U.S. is meaningful, but where do we go from there? The biggest cliché used in innocence 
literature is the tip of the iceberg because the confirmed number of exonerated individuals is 
likely only a small fraction of the actual number. In 2015, 149 innocent people were exonerated, 
or more than two per week.26 Yet, there is no way to know what is under the surface or how 
many innocent people are behind bars right now. Lara Bazelon, attorney and director of Loyola 
Law School’s Project for the Innocent, writes that the most conservative estimate is between 
10,000 and 20,000 people who are currently locked up in the U.S.27 
 
iv.  Rape and Capital Crime 
In 2007, Michael D. Risinger published the first ever empirically justified wrongful 
conviction rate. Focusing on capital rape-murders in the 1980s, he developed the conclusion that 
                                                
22 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “2013 Outcome Evaluation Report,” (January 2014): 24. 
23 “The National Registry of Exonerations,” University of Michigan Law School, last updated March 2, 2016. 
24 “Number of DNA Exonerations,” Innocence Project, accessed March 2, 2016. 
25 International Association of Police Chiefs, “National Summit on Wrongful Convictions: Building a Systematic Approach to 
Prevent Wrongful Conviction.” August 2013. 
26 Ari Melber and Marti Haus, “Jailed But Innocent: Record Number of People Exonerated in 2015,” NBC News, February 3, 
2016. 
27 Laura Bazelon, “Scalia’s Embarrassing Question,” Slate, March, 11th, 2015. 
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there is a 3.3% error rate for this specific subset of criminal convictions.28 If we were to 
extrapolate this rate to the entire 2007 prison population,29 his estimation would be that there 
were 52,744 people in the US were being erroneously punished. This is a much higher estimate 
than Bazelon’s; however, Risinger does not suggest that the error rate he found for capital rape-
murders applies to all crimes. Risinger describes how he got these results emphasizing that in 
order to derive a factual wrongful conviction rate, we must have a numerator and a 
denominator.30 In his numerator, Risinger only included DNA exonerations to avoid any debates 
about factual innocence versus court misconduct. Of course, since not all overturned convictions 
involve DNA, his numerator is cautiously small at 10.5. This number represents eleven 
defendants of capital rape-murder trials who were found to be factually innocent between 1982 
and 1989. Risinger subtracted one-half of an exoneration in order to make his figures even more 
conservative. As he states: “If we give an exceedingly generous probability of one in twenty to 
the factual guilt of an apparently exonerated defendant, then a statistical exclusion of one-half an 
exoneration covers it.”31  
Risinger recognized that in order to reach a defensible conclusion, the denominator should 
be solely made up of “capital convictions in which it is reasonable to believe that bodily sources 
of DNA might have been left in such a way as to provide the basis for including or excluding a 
defendant as the possible perpetrator.”32 Since there were 2235 capital sentences from 1982 to 
1989 and since 21.45% of capital sentences between those years involved a rape-murder, 2235 
multiplied by .2145 produced a denominator of 479. From these numbers, Risinger concludes 
that a factual innocence rate of rape-murders within this time frame must be a bare minimum of 
2.2%. However, he then reduces the denominator to 319 because he estimates from Innocence 
Project data that 33.3% of rape-murder cases yield no usable DNA. With this subtraction made, 
he arrives at a minimum innocence rate of 3.3% among these certain cases and within this 
specific time period. 
                                                
28 Michael D. Risinger, “Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate,” Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology, 96 (2006-2007): 761. 
29  The total prison population, both federal and state, in 2007 according to the BJS was 1,598,316 people. 
30 Risinger, “Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate,” 768. 
31 Risinger, “Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate,” 774. 
32 Ibid, 772. 
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In order to produce a range, Risinger then goes on to find a maximum innocence rate. He 
believes the maximum is less than double, which would make it 6.6% and so argues “it is fair to 
put a reasonable maximum under these circumstances at around 5%.”33 His evidence for this 
maximum appears to be concluded rather quickly; however, his minimum estimate for capital-
rape cases between 1982 to 1989 (inclusive) seems defensible due to his careful logic and data 
collection. It is also in line with the subsequent estimate of Samuel Gross (2014) who estimated a 
4.1% error rate for capital convictions. Accepting this 3-5% error rate of factual innocence in 
capital cases is scary and certainly cannot be waved away as insignificant for those both inside 
and outside the criminal justice system. 
More recently, Garrett (2015) showed that out of the pool of 250 DNA exonerees at the 
time, 68% of those were exonerated from rape cases. This is significant since only 12.5% of all 
sentenced prisoners in 2014 were convicted of rape or sexual assault.34 As previously mentioned, 
this indicates that exonerees in rape cases are easier to find since the perpetrators are more likely 
to leave DNA evidence compared to other types of crimes. It seems likely that other crimes that 
do not leave DNA evidence as often could have this high rate as well, but we do not yet have a 
way of knowing for sure. 
 
v. Beyond DNA Testing  
Because death penalty cases are so unique it is also important to look at studies that have 
sought to estimate the total rate of false convictions using mechanisms other than DNA testing. 
Among peer-reviewed studies, there seems to be general consensus that the error rate is likely no 
lower than one percent and no higher than three to five percent. Thus, while we cannot 
extrapolate Risinger’s 3-5% or Gross’s 4.1% error rate estimate of wrongful rape and death 
sentences to the entire criminal justice system, many of the findings from studies that used other 
methodologies fit within this accepted total range of error.  
One such mechanism that scholars use to model and estimate the error rate in our criminal 
justice system is through gauging professional perception—how often the people who work in 
the criminal justice system reasonably think that errors occur. Zalman, Smith and Kiger 
                                                
33 Ibid, 780. 
34 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “National Crime Statistics,”(2015) 16. 
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“surveyed all sheriffs, a random sample of police chiefs, all trial and appellate judges (including 
Supreme Court justices), and all chief prosecutors in Michigan”35 and from the 853 people who 
they surveyed they received 467 responses.36 Respondents were asked to “estimate the 
percentage of wrongful conviction [meaning ‘actual innocence’] that occurs “in my jurisdiction” 
and “in the United States.”37 For the estimates of wrongful conviction in their own districts:  
Almost 25 percent of the defense attorneys gave an estimate of 4–5% wrongful convictions 
(the mode), and almost 30 percent put the proportion of wrongful convictions as 11% or 
higher… Police and prosecutors accounted for almost all of the respondents who believed 
that no wrongful convictions had occurred; defense attorneys estimated the largest 
percentage of wrongful convictions; and in judges’ opinions the frequency of wrongful 
convictions was higher than that estimated by police and prosecutors and lower than that 
estimated by defense attorneys.38 
 
Given the aligned results from both DNA-based studies and professional assessment, it seems 
reasonable that the rate of wrongful convictions for all types of crime in the U.S. is somewhere 
between 1% and 5%.  
If the U.S. currently detains 1.6 million people in prison,39 a 1% error rate would mean that 
15,615 of those people are wrongly incarcerated. Far worse, a 5% error rate would mean that 
78,075 people are currently being punished for crimes that they did not commit. Given such a 
high number of innocent people being condemned to a punishment meant for someone else, it 
seems odd that, “Our judicial system does not normally conduct inquiries when miscarriages of 
justice occur.”40  
Wrongly convicted prisoners are more than data; they are more than false positives (also 
known as type I errors in statistics when one asserts something that is not actually there) – they 
are living suffering human beings. It is appalling to both the individual and the community that 
our society has not done a better job of addressing the issue of wrongful conviction. It is 
unfortunate when a guilty person gets away with a crime, but far more unfortunate when we 
punish a blameless person. Before turning our attention to possible ways to prevent these terrible 
occurrences, it is helpful to look at the role of politics in this area. 
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Political Aspects of the Issue  
The data on wrongful conviction are not just important for measuring human harm, but 
these numbers are also used to impact political positions and support judicial decisions. In fact, 
estimations of the number of wrongly convicted people have played a significant role in Supreme 
Court decisions on this subject. 
One such famous estimation was made in a 2006 Op-Ed by Joshua Marquis, the District 
Attorney of Clatsop County in Oregon. Why is an estimate that was not peer-reviewed or 
published in an academic journal so significant? It is significant because the late Justice Scalia 
cited it in Kansas v. Marsh (2006). In the Op-Ed, Marquis countered what he viewed as 
misconstrued “conventional wisdom: that our prisons are chock-full of doe-eyed innocents who 
have been framed by venal prosecutors and corrupt police officers with the help of grossly 
incompetent public defenders.”41 In order to do this, he reached an estimate of the actual number 
of innocent people behind bars or on death row from an exhaustive study carried out by 
University of Michigan law professor Samuel Gross that was published in the Winter 2005 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. In this study, Gross documents 340 inmates who 
were exonerated between 1989 and 2003. Making what Marquis considers to be a wildly 
generous calculation, he states: 
[L]et's assume that he understated the number of innocents by roughly a factor of 10, 
that instead of 340 there were 4,000 people in prison who weren't involved in the crime 
in any way. During that same 15 years, there were more than 15 million felony 
convictions across the country. That would make the error rate .027 percent — or, to put 
it another way, a success rate of 99.973 percent.42 
 
These words and data were cited in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion where he agreed 
with the Court’s decision that a death penalty statute that allows the defendant to be sentenced to 
death when “mitigating and aggravating factors” are found to be of equal weight does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Granted, 4,000 people is 
still a lot of people who are undeservingly in prison, yet both Marquis and Scalia claim that it is 
insignificant for the total number of individuals who are incarcerated in our country. Marquis 
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even wryly notes that many industries would be ecstatic to have a 99.973 rate of success. The 
two do not see the system as broken, but instead as one that is doing its best. 
Justice Scalia is happy with this high estimate of success as he points out that: “One cannot 
have a system of criminal punishment without accepting the possibility that someone will be 
punished mistakenly. That is a truism, not a revelation.”43 With this in mind, he indicates that a 
low rate of false conviction is something we should be proud of. Marquis and Justice Scalia 
believe that Americans (especially death penalty abolitionists) should become less concerned 
with innocent people being incarcerated and more concerned with guilty perpetrators being let 
off. 
For me, Justice Scalia’s thinking in Kansas v. Marsh and his reliance on Marquis’ data is 
wishful. It’s true there will always be mistakes within any criminal justice system, but when 
these mistakes become consistent and systematic rather than anomalies, there is a societal 
problem. Scalia also argued more recently in Glossip v. Gross (2015) that innocent individuals 
facing the death penalty are better off than those sentenced to life in prison because they are 
more likely to be exonerated given the strong anti-death penalty lobbies, the strict scrutiny 
applied in these cases and the systematic appeals for which they are eligible.44 
Following Scalia’s 2006 citation of Marquis’s 4,000 estimation that was based on Gross’s 
study, Gross came out with a new study in 2004. In it, he conservatively estimates that there is a 
4.1% rate of false conviction among death-sentenced defendants.45 After pointing out that the 
arithmetic that Justice Scalia relied on is “silly,”46 he goes on to try to find a more logical 
estimate of the error rate. To do this, he explains that because individuals on death row are tried 
and retried so many times whereas individuals in the general prison population are rarely 
represented by a lawyer again after their initial conviction, we can use death penalty cases as a 
gage, yet they unfortunately cannot be used to generalize the wrongful conviction rate in all 
crime since murder is a unique type of crime in the way that it is treated.47 Only 0.1 percent of 
people in prison are sentenced to death row so Gross is researching a very specific subset of 
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people within the criminal justice system; however, he has a good reason for sticking to this 
group as he explains: 
The vast majority of criminal convictions are not candidates for exoneration because 
no one makes any effort to reconsider the guilt of the defendants. Approximately 95% 
of felony convictions in the United States are based on negotiated pleas of guilt (plea 
bargains) that are entered in routine proceeding; at which no evidence is presented. 
Few are ever subject to any review whatsoever.48 
 
Death penalty cases can, however, serve as a natural experiment to decide how many cases 
would be overturned if they received the same scrutiny. These are a small population of cases 
where the system checks and double checks its work, allowing us to get a taste of what the 
results would be if the entire system were to continuously question itself until it was sure that it 
made the correct verdict. It’s important to note that here, Gross also speculates why there are so 
many false convictions. Scalia’s fixation with the accuracy of the court system does not hold up 
because most felony convictions do not see a courtroom. 
At some point, we must set aside what our judicial system does and does not do and ask: 
Do we want to accept this? This is the question that I will develop in my next section by looking 
through the lens of society and asking what we want to do about this issue. Before I do, I will 
address one final piece of the data on wrongful incarceration that I view is an important primer 
for the theoretical discussion of this topic – the inequality of the risk. 
 
Is the Risk Shared Equally? 
 A final significant aspect of the size and impact of the exoneree issue is determining 
whether or not the risk of wrongful conviction is equally shared among U.S. citizens. This is 
important not only to characterize the problem but also in considering the argument against 
compensation that wrongful conviction is a risk that each citizen must accept as part of having a 
necessarily imperfect criminal justice system. 
At least once a month there seems to be a front-page story in the New York Times about 
erroneous conviction. Just recently, an article told of the death of a twelve-year old boy that was 
unexpectedly strangled in his mother’s apartment in a small town in upstate New York. Within a 
few hours of his discovery the police arrived at Mr. Hillary’s door. Soon after they dropped 
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white suspects who could have been equally as likely to have committed the crime in turn for 
Mr. Hillary, their only black suspect: 
The prominent civil rights lawyer Norman Siegel has consulted with the defense on the case, 
believing Mr. Hillary to be innocent. 
In Mr. Hillary’s view, the prosecution’s zeal — as well as the way he has been treated since 
Garrett’s death — may revolve on one other salient detail. 
“It goes to show the color of my skin,” Mr. Hillary said in a soft Caribbean cadence.49 
 
Despite making the front page, this is not a unique story. Out of the 337 post-conviction DNA 
exonerations made in the U.S. by February 2016, 206 of those were African-American 
exonerees.50 
There is little doubt that the rate of incarceration in the U.S. is racially skewed. At the end 
of 2013, a total of 36.2% of the prison population was African-American, 21.9% was Hispanic 
and 33.3% was white.51 This compares to 2014 census data showing that the general population 
contains 13.2% African-American, 17.4% Hispanic, and 77.4% White. In other words, the 
African-American population in prison was significantly higher than the population, the Hispanic 
prison population was slightly higher, and the White prison population was significantly lower.  
The issues of false conviction rates and exoneration rates by race in the US is less clear, as 
is the larger question of whether or not every member of our society takes the same chance of 
becoming wrongly incarcerated than others. If one of the goals of our criminal justice system is 
to protect the innocent, yet a segment of our population is disproportionately subject to false 
convictions with less likelihood of exoneration, than there is a serious systemic problem. 
The exoneration data by race is a challenge to interpret. Out of the 337 Innocence Project 
exonerees as of May 2016, 206 are African Americans, 104 are Caucasian, 25 are Hispanic and 2 
are Asian-American.52 This means that African-Americans make up 61.1% of all DNA 
exonerations done by the Innocence Project compared to 36.2% of the prison population and 
13.2% of the general population. Does this mean that the Innocence Project disproportionately 
seeks African-American cases? Or that African-Americans are more likely to be involved in 
cases with DNA evidence? Or that African-Americans are more likely to be wrongly convicted? 
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The Caucasian exoneration rate is slightly lower than the Caucasian incarceration rate with 
30.9% of the DNA exonerations compared to a 33.3% incarceration population. Hispanics, on 
the other hand, appear to be underrepresented in DNA exonerations making up only 7.4% of the 
Innocence Project’s exonerations compared to making up 21.9% of the total US prison 
population. Does this mean that the Innocence Project does not seek Hispanic cases? Or that 
Hispanics are less likely to be involved in cases with DNA evidence? Or that Hispanics are less 
likely to be wrongly incarcerated? 
The data is a bit confusing since it seems plausible that African-Americans are more likely 
to be wrongly convicted due to racial bias, however, it does not seem plausible that Hispanics are 
less likely. Perhaps the Innocence Project needs to do a better job of seeking out Hispanic cases. 
At the same time the data does suggest that African-Americans are more likely to be convicted of 
a crime that they did not commit than other racial groups. 
Seeing as only two people out of the 337 DNA exonerees were female, men appear to have 
a much higher chance of being wrongly convicted than women. It’s true that men make up more 
of the total US prison population and women only make up 6.7% of it; however, two female 
exonerees out of the 337 give us a percentage of only .6%, which is notably lower. 
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III.              Addressing the System—Minimizing the Risk of Wrongful Conviction 
 
 
In the previous section I discussed the social science data and analysis that surrounds the 
size and scope of wrongful conviction within the U.S. criminal justice system. This analysis 
indicates that wrongful conviction is not a matter of anomaly; it is a systematic problem that we 
need to address through concrete solutions. While there are already many organizations in the 
Innocence Network that seek to find people who are currently being wrongly incarcerated, this 
information also causes us to ask: What could be done to reduce the risk of defendants being 
falsely convicted now and in the future? Use greater scrutiny? Conduct more DNA testing? Stop 
using lineups? Scholars have suggested a plethora of mechanisms for modifying the criminal 
justice system in order to make the process more fair and less prone to error, yet it is difficult to 
know which ones to focus on. 
According to Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, “Errors are 
the insects in the world of law, traveling through it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless 
procession. Many are plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful. Some, for all the benign 
appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of followers that deplete trials of 
fairness.”53 Given that these errors have added up to putting innocent people in prison for 14 
years on average and for a total of 4,606 years,54 something needs to be done. This section seeks 
to address the most harmful and systemic errors in our criminal justice system. The following 
section will address how we should deal with the consequences of these errors through 
compensation, as well as what our priorities should be in moving forward. 
Scholars have come to some agreement on the many sources of error that lead to wrongful 
convictions. Moreover, this base of knowledge is not particularly new. In their 1973 paper “One 
Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After a Century of Research,” Jon B. Gould and 
Richard A. Leo state that we are in no way “unaware of the sources of these errors.”55 Gould and 
Leo outline seven categories of conviction error: (1) mistaken eyewitness identification; (2) false 
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confessions; (3) tunnel vision; (4) informant testimony; (5) imperfect forensic sciences; (6) 
prosecutorial misconduct; and (7) the role of race, media and failure of post-conviction 
remedies.56  The authors conclude that it is crucial that researchers take action in contributing to 
policy and systematic changes in the criminal justice system so that research on wrongful 
conviction does not become a purely “academic exercise.” They are troubled to find that the 
criminology field, unlike the medical and transportation safety fields for example, does not yet 
have a culture or a system of incentives established to learn from its mistakes.57 Even 43 years 
later, it appears that the criminal justice system has yet to develop this type of internal learning 
culture, possibly due to its often partisan instead of professional nature. Instead, NGOs are the 
ones who put external pressure on the justice system. 
However, I do not think that we can solely blame the partisan nature of criminal justice for 
the system’s lack of change and growth. As a profession, the criminal justice system does its 
job—it works to find those who are guilty and convict them. Perhaps the problem is that it is not 
part of the industry’s job description to find the innocent and exonerate them. Brandon L. Garrett 
points out in his book Convicting the Innocent, that appellate judges view their responsibility to 
be correcting legal errors, not factual errors. Unfortunately, many of the errors in exonerees’ 
cases are factual errors with evidence, testimony or false confessions.  
Making matters worse, in an attempt to make judge’s jobs easier the U.S. Supreme Court 
has designed multiple “tests” to determine the potential harm of trial errors. This makes sense 
because judges face the task of having to decide which errors made in the trial process merit 
throwing out the trial and which are “harmless.” Thus, the “harmless error test” was developed 
in Chapman v. California (1967), and it serves to determine if errors made at criminal trial, even 
of a Constitutional magnitude, are bad enough that the judge should grant a new trial. The Court 
held that all types of errors (including Constitutional ones) can be deemed as “harmless error” so 
long as no reasonable doubt exists that the error could have led to the verdict of the case in 
question.58 In Garrett’s study he found that the “harmless error test” can actually be quite 
harmful. Of the 250 DNA exonerations that he studied, 165 exoneree cases had a written 
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decision. Of these 165 cases, in 39 or 30% of them the court had used the “harmless error test” to 
refuse a reversal of the conviction. These were people pleading a reversal who we now know to 
be innocent. 
Brady claims (Brady v. Maryland, 1963) are another example of a possible claim that a 
petitioner might make; yet that in practice do not generally provide relief to the defendant. Even 
if a defendant successfully shows that “the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence of innocence to 
the defense, and this evidence was significant [… ] enough that there is a reasonable probability 
that concealing the evidence affected the outcome of the trial,”59 they are still unlikely to receive 
a reversal (only four out of the forty-two in exoneree cases were successful). It appears that one 
strategy for making the criminal justice system more responsive to potential wrongful 
convictions would be to strengthen the impact of challenges such as Brady claims, and reduce 
the impact of mechanisms that make the court less flexible, such as “harmless error tests.” 
Another such mechanism stems from Strickland v. Washington, which decided that 
adequate defense representation must only fall “within a wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”60 This wording makes it nearly impossible to prove a violation of the Strickland 
standard. Strickland is also known as the “foggy mirror test” because it more or less states that 
“if a mirror held under the defense lawyer’s nose during trial would fog up, indicating the lawyer 
is alive and breathing, the lawyer has provided adequate assistance” to the defendant.61 Judges 
are unlikely to site prosecutorial misconducts and even if they do, judges can still claim that the 
defendant was not “prejudiced” by it and deny a reversal. Thus while under the Sixth 
Amendment everyone has the right to a trial, the right to a specific quality of trial is less clear. 
Another disconcerting decision that set a precedent that is tolerant of potential trial errors 
was developed in the Supreme Court case, Manson v. Brathwaite (1977). Here, the Court held 
“that even if the police engage in suggestive procedures so potentially misleading that their 
conduct violates due process, the identification may still be admitted at trial if it was otherwise 
‘reliabl[e].’”62 We now know that one out of four people who were erroneously convicted and 
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later exonerated by DNA made a false confession or incriminating statement,63 often under 
pressure from police interrogators. Thus this 1977 ruling seems to be an important ingredient in 
the recipe for erroneous conviction. 
If we add to the pot another innocence standard articulated in Herrera v. Collins (1993), we 
see that habeas corpus rules make it nearly impossible for anyone to ever be exonerated without 
clear DNA evidence to prove their innocence. In Herrera v. Collins the question was posed to 
the Court: Is the Eighth Amendment violated if an innocent person is put to death? Here, the 
majority decision failed to answer this question; only the concurrence of Justice O’Conner and 
the dissent affirmatively responded that yes, it is cruel and unusual punishment for the State to 
end the life of an innocent person. Garrett points out that, “[w]hile this may come as a surprise, 
since a right to be freed if one is innocent seems fundamental, the Supreme Court to this day has 
not decided whether a claim of innocence can in fact be made under the U.S. Constitution.”64 
Worse, the Opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Rehnquist, disallowed future habeas 
reviews from making a plea of actual innocence by the defendant stating that: “Few rulings 
would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of 
freestanding claims of actual innocence.”65 Rehnquist’s main concern appears to be that of 
society’s resources, yet he and the majority do not address society’s moral obligation. 
Together, these systematic procedures and precedents seem to have been decided in the 
name of efficiency, yet together, they also seem to undermine the quality and flexibility of the 
system as a whole, especially its ability to prevent wrongful conviction. Unfortunately, the 
difficulty of being exonerated has only increased with the 1996 enactment of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposed strict rules that limit “federal 
habeas corpus review, strict time limits, limits on filing more than one habeas corpus,…”66 etc. 
Given these multiple roadblocks to exoneration, it’s inconceivable that anyone is ever successful. 
In order to increase the chances for innocent individuals to be exonerated, Brandon Garrett 
argues that if we are going to provide more resources in the process, they should be focused 
during “the appeals, when less time has passed, when convicts have lawyers and when 
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sufficiency of evidence claims can be raised.”67 He adds that we “should also examine ways to 
enhance factual review during post-conviction proceedings.”68 In short, the sooner we can 
exonerate an innocently convicted person the better both for the ease of the procedural system 
and to minimize their personal lost time. 
Because this does not always work in practice, the issue of compensation is the focus of the 
next section. It is worth pointing out here that one of the best forms of “compensation” is 
actually for society to invest in systematic reform of the criminal justice system. Presently there 
is no mechanism within the system to consistently do this. However, given the number of 
barriers currently in place that hinder factual review of post-conviction innocence claims, it is 
time the State to provide those mechanisms. Below I present strategies for fixing these and other 
procedural mistakes that are made in the criminal justice system, inevitably leading to false 
conviction and retention. 
 
There are numerous potential models for effective reform of the criminal justice system 
that would increase the likelihood of catching and reversing false convictions. Brandon Garrett 
has applauded North Carolina for the reforms that they have implemented. After having at least 
seven DNA exonerations in 1995, the chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court decided 
that it was his duty to prevent further wrongful convictions. Thus, North Carolina adopted the 
Actual Innocence Commission in 2002. First, this commission drastically changed the lineup 
procedure. It then pressured officials to enact laws to reduce false confessions including 
interrogation recording in homicide cases, better preservation of evidence, access to DNA 
testing, and more post-exoneration support for the wrongfully convicted.69 The commission also 
looked at measures to improve factual review of post-conviction innocence claims and used 
elements from Canada and the UK’s justice systems to create an Innocence Commission whose 
sole goal is to examine whether a person is innocent and should be exonerated. More than ten 
states have taken up similar reforms to North Carolina, but none have been quite as effective. 
Another more costly yet highly effective way to ensure that the system finds wrongly 
convicted individuals is to offer post-conviction state and federal review for all prisoners serving 
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life without parole sentences. This makes sense because, as Scalia has rightly pointed out (and as 
strange as it may seem), it is more difficult to be exonerated when serving a life sentence than 
when on death row. 
Both innocent commissions and automatic post-conviction review would be big steps 
towards making it easier for innocents to be exonerated from prison. If the goal is to prevent the 
incarceration of innocent people in the first place, however, there are more steps that need to be 
taken. Many of these are not as labor intensive or as costly as creating an entire commission 
devoted to wrongly incarcerated individuals or providing every individual serving a life sentence 
post-conviction review. Scholars recommend that police departments implement mandatory 
videotaping in interrogations. This is an inexpensive mechanism that could help protect officers 
and witnesses alike. This would also make judges jobs easier because instead of having to decide 
the credibility of what was said during an interview that they were not present at, they could see 
what went on during the interrogation for themselves.70 
The police, however, are just one element of the system that produces wrongful 
convictions; prosecutors have also been pointed to as another culprit who enhances the rate of 
conviction error. There is an unfortunate belief that prosecutors want to prosecute the defendant 
regardless of their perceived innocence. While there have been some cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct to achieve conviction, most prosecutors want to do a good job and convict the right 
person. Even so, there is a strong argument to be made for “open-file” policies that give the 
defense access to the prosecution’s file. This would be a positive systematic reform to stop 
incarcerating innocent people because there have been many cases where the prosecution has 
hidden evidence that the defendant was innocent. One recent example where this policy could 
have spared 25 years of an innocent man’s life is the case of Andre Hatchett who was exonerated 
by the Innocence Project on March 10th, 2016. The Innocence Project reported that: 
The state’s case against Andre Hatchett was based entirely on one eyewitness, but 
records reveal this witness identified another person as the assailant on the night 
of the crime. That information was never disclosed to Mr. Hatchett’s defense 
attorneys. In addition, at the time of the crime, Mr. Hatchett was in a leg cast and on 
crutches, which would have made it virtually physically impossible for him to 
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commit the murder. His defense lawyers never presented these medical records at 
trial.71 
Cases like these are unnerving, and could be prevented using the knowledge that we have and the 
solutions that have been proposed. 
It is baffling that so many states have not sought out reform. Noting that wrongful 
conviction is a “double failure”—not only does the wrong person get punished, but the 
perpetrator is still among us, — Stephanie Kent and Jason Carmichael asked the question: Why 
have some states instituted laws aimed at reducing wrongful conviction errors while others have 
largely avoided the issue?72 Kent and Carmichael hypothesized two major explanatory reasons: 
(1) political climate and (2) extent of interest group advocacy. 
Kent and Carmichael found empirical evidence that disputed claims that wrongful 
conviction was a bipartisan issue and not subject to politics or special interest advocacy. “These 
findings counter claims among innocence movement leaders and others that wrongful conviction 
is a valence issue that is supported by both liberals and conservatives.”73 However, a Republican 
governor is not enough to cause a state to lack policies that work to minimize and compensate 
wrongful convictions. The authors found that the legislature (not the governor) has more impact 
on whether or not these laws get passed.74  
All in all, Kent and Carmichael found that political climate plays an important role in the 
passage of laws that criminal justice scholars, including the Innocence Project itself, support. 
“Our findings here thus support the idea that changes to social control apparatuses in the U.S., 
including legal change, are more responsive to the social and political climate than actual levels 
of crime.”75 Nevertheless, only looking at the “redness” or “blueness” of a state does not tell the 
whole story about the work that needs to be done in the innocence realm. 
Even more important than political climate are advocacy groups working to lobby and 
pressure legislatures to pass laws that favor innocent defendants. “We found that states with 
more Innocence Network organizations are nearly two-and-a-half times more likely to have laws 
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requiring the preservation of DNA evidence after a criminal trial than those without an office in 
the state.”76 It is surprising that advocacy groups were seen as more likely to create legislation 
than the awareness of wrongful convictions in a State. Texas is known for its positive legislation 
that was developed after a man died in prison who was later found to be innocent. However, 
Kent and Carmichael state, “perhaps our most important and unexpected finding is that the 
frequency of discovered wrongful convictions in a state does not affect its likelihood of 
implementing legislative changes aimed at preventing wrongful convictions.”77 It’s really 
advocacy groups that affect change and are able to do the most work, even where there is “a 
majority Republican voting public.”78 This has implications for further solutions, especially in 
many of the blue states that have yet to adopt these kinds of laws. This also suggests that NGOs 
such as innocence projects, which have cropped up all across the country, are doing effective 
work. 
It is evident that both State and Federal legislative action is needed to fix the problems with 
our criminal justice system. There has been some effort on this front, for example, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Innocence Protection Act as part of the Justice for All Act (2004).79 This 
piece of legislation granted federal inmates the right to petition for modern DNA testing and 
incentivized states to do the same. Kent and Carmichael establish a coding scheme to assess how 
well state legislatures were doing in this area. They focused on three leading factors that lead to 
wrongful convictions and the legal solutions that coincide with them. They also added a fourth 
legal method of assistance to their coding, monetary compensation, to help exonerees once they 
are released. The three laws that they focused on were: prohibiting “show-ups,” a procedure 
where the victim is brought directly before the perpetrator and asked if he or she is the person 
(77-84% of wrongful convictions included this practice), recorded interrogations to limit or more 
easily find false confessions (16% of the first 250 DNA exonerees confessed to crimes they did 
not commit), and mandatory preservation of DNA to limit the mishandling of scientific evidence 
(the Innocence Project claims that over 50% of the cases they handle are involved with this80). 
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Given how commonly our system produces false convictions and how difficult it is to 
prove one’s innocence, another practical way to reduce the size and inequity of the problem is to 
reduce the severity of punishment. The Supreme Court ruling that the death penalty is 
constitutional raises the stakes for wrongfully convicted individuals, since those who are 
sentenced and put to death can never receive individual compensation for the mistake.  DNA 
testing is not cheap—the Innocence Project pays over $1,000 per test and some cases involve 
multiple rounds of testing on several different items of evidence.81 While this seems expensive, 
consider how much it costs for a trial, especially a capital one, to proceed, and how much more it 
costs the victim of false conviction, including family and friends. 
 
 
 
Capital Punishment Reform 
In 1972 the Supreme Court decided in Furman v Georgia (1972) that in specific cases the 
death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating the Eighth Amendment. 
They decided that, “states and the national legislature [should] rethink their statutes for capital 
offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or 
discriminatory manner.”82 Apart from Justice White, the ruling majority was left leaning, while 
the dissents came from the justices on the right. Over thirty years later, this same ideological split 
was seen in Herrera v Collins (1993) when this time, the right majority, including Justice White, 
refused to grant that sentencing an innocent person to death is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment and ruled against the petitioner. They decided that there is no “constitutional claim 
for relief based upon his newly discovered evidence of innocence.”83 Justice Scalia concurred 
with the Court. So as not to be mistaken he wrote: “There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in 
contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand 
judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after 
conviction.”84 However, Scalia’s logic had unfortunate consequences because there was no 
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“text”, “tradition” or “contemporary practice” to address the wrongs done to innocent citizens, 
incarcerated through no fault of their own.  
Given authentic concerns of wrongful conviction, innocence advocates call for the removal 
of the death penalty as a mechanism to decrease the severity of punishment. This seems desirable 
given the uncertainty surrounding conviction in capital cases. Garrett cites a famous study, done 
by Liebman, Fagan and West, which found that all capital punishment cases from 1973 through 
1995 both in state and federal post-conviction review had an extremely high reversal rate of 
68%. The reversal rate for noncapital cases, Garrett found, is around 9 or 10%. He states “… the 
incidence of reversals on factual claims in appeals of serious convictions provides cause for 
concern regarding the accuracy of such criminal trials. Because DNA evidence is not available in 
most cases, we can never know how many post-conviction petitioners are really innocent.”85 All 
of this information combined with the fact that, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court still 
has not responded as to whether putting a factually innocent person to death is a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, suggest we still have a long way to go.86 
So far, I have shed light on the surprising number of factually innocent people who have 
been or currently are being wrongly incarcerated and how difficult the system makes their 
exoneration. In the next section, I discuss whether exonerees should be compensated and, if so, 
what this compensation should be. 
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IV. Compensation 
 
i. Should Society Compensate Exonerees? 
Is society responsible for compensating those who we find to have been wrongfully 
convicted in our justice system and are factually innocent? Where is the fault and who is 
responsible? Some argue that the US criminal justice system is not at fault. They argue, for 
example, that we view DNA and other types of innocent exoneration as a success of the system, 
not a failure.87 But as Brandon L. Garrett, Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of 
Law at University of Virginia points out, DNA technology is typically introduced into a case 
from the outside, and thus, should be thought of as a failure of the system rather than a success.88 
If the justice system has fundamental flaws and if erroneous convictions occur at the remarkable 
rate that many scholars suggest—that is, around one in twenty—then it seems reasonable to 
conclude that we as a society have a generic problem on our hands. This problem raises some 
important philosophical questions, many of which touch on the fundamental relationship 
between those who govern and those who are being governed. 
The question of whether or not society should compensate exonerees is both important and 
controversial. There are arguments for both sides and this question does not call for a simple yes 
or no binary decision. On one hand, we can see compensation as a tax that society should pay for 
having a criminal justice system that makes mistakes. I will call this view, the “Social Safety 
Tax” viewpoint. On the other, we can look at the possibility of a person being convicted of a 
crime that they did not commit as a small risk that each citizen accepts as being a part of a 
society with a justice system that benefits all, but is necessary imperfect. I will refer to this 
position as the “Play at Your Own Risk” viewpoint. 
I see three distinct, primary reasons why society should support and create laws that 
advocate for the “Social Safety Tax” perspective and against individuals having to “Play At 
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Their Own Risk.” Society should compensate individuals who are wronged by the criminal 
justice system because:  
• Our society believes in and has set precedents for compensating citizens when 
events occur that are beyond their control,  
• our society values equal opportunity and justice and we are not upholding this value 
if we do not compensate those who have been wrongly set back (Some might go so 
far as to call this a right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a State from curtailing “the privileges or 
immunities of citizens”), and 
• the risk of being erroneously convicted is not equally shared (i.e. it is not 1 in 318.9 
million for each citizen) and thus some people face an unfairly higher probability of 
wrongful conviction than others.  
Together, these points argue that it is unjust for the majority of us to benefit from a system 
if we do not provide compensation to those people who it unfairly harms. Private industry such 
as oil companies benefit from our business, yet when they cause negative externalities such as oil 
spills, we expect and demand for them to clean it up. Compensation to innocent exonerees is no 
different, except that society is the one responsible for cleaning up a mess that is caused by a 
system we all benefit from. 
In Part II of this section I take the position that society is responsible for compensation and 
tackle some of the difficult questions regarding the appropriate ways to provide this 
compensation. First, however, I address some of the counterarguments that have been made to 
this position that exonerees should be compensated by society. 
 
The Counterarguments 
In Convicting the Innocent, Borchard raises three arguments that have been made against 
compensation: (1) the State cannot be held accountable for the hardships that particular 
individuals have to suffer when it is exercising its “sovereign right,”89 (2) if the State is acting 
lawfully it cannot injure anyone,90 and, perhaps the strongest of the three, (3) there can be no 
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liability if there is not fault. Addressing these arguments sheds additional light on the 
philosophical and political aspects of the exoneree compensation issue. 
 
 (1) The State cannot be held accountable for the hardships that particular individuals have to 
suffer when it is exercising its “sovereign right.”91 
This first argument asserts that the State cannot be held accountable for harm to individuals 
in the course of carrying out its lawful duties. The State is doing the best job it can, and it cannot 
be perfect. Therefore, it is not responsible for “incidental harm” in the process of doing its job. 
But in the case of systemic wrongful conviction, there is another way to look at this. 
The key distinction here is that States are not simply doing their jobs and being surprised 
by the rare outlier case where individuals suffer harm; they are fully aware that harm is being 
done on a regular basis, but are choosing not to address that harm out of convenience. In the U.S. 
the principle that government rules under the consent of the governed goes all the way back to 
the Declaration of Independence.  Under the influence of Locke, Jefferson wrote: 
…governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed... Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the 
right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation 
on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely 
to effect their safety and happiness.92 
Paired here with the assertion that governments derive their powers from the consent of the 
governed is the follow-on assertion that when the government becomes destructive of the safety 
and happiness of its citizens, they have the right to alter or abolish it. 
 Given the approximately 5% rate of wrongful conviction and the use of DNA testing to 
provide concrete evidence of innocence, a State’s refusal to provide compensation for wrongful 
punishment can be seen as an intentional act that is destructive to its citizens, not, as this 
argument asserts, just the State doing its job. 
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(2) If the State is acting lawfully it cannot injure anyone. 
This second argument asserts that so long as the State is not breaking any law, it cannot 
harm anyone. This appears to be untrue simply on the face of it. There is no requiring States to 
compensate exonerees (although it is recommended in the Federal law), yet exonerees have 
suffered catastrophic harm. There is no law broken when a hurricane destroys a coastline, yet we 
compensate people for their losses. In addition, society is deriving benefits from the criminal 
justice system that could not currently be derived without the systemic occurrence of false 
conviction. In that sense, society owes these victims. 
We already compensate individuals who face harms that are brought onto them for the 
greater good of society. For example, if the State needs to seize an individual’s property in order 
to complete a public project such as demolishing a person’s waterfront property in order to build 
a bridge, the State has to pay the owner of the waterfront property compensation. It is unjust for 
the State to claim that the owner benefits from the bridge just as much as everyone else does and 
that having their property seized was simply a risk that each member of society faces. 
Being wrongly convicted of a crime is similar. In order to have a criminal justice system 
the State must subject everyone to the risk of being wrongly incarcerated (even if this risk is 
unequal). So, while everyone benefits from this establishment, when one person pays an unusual 
price for the shared public good (such as being mistakenly convicted) that person is owed 
compensation, parallel to property owners who pay an unusual price for public goods (such as 
losing their house) are compensated. 
While compensation is and mostly should be for the purpose of serving the individual who 
has faced unimaginably unfair treatment, it also has a positive externality on society. This 
phenomenon can be witnessed when there is an outcry for the US government to come to the aid 
of people harmed by natural disaster. It is expected that the State provide disaster relief, which is 
merely assistance provided to people who are harmed through no cause of their own. Social 
safety net payments and victim’s compensation are other examples of kinds of compensations 
that are allocating to individuals and families who have suffered through no fault of their own. If 
we didn’t believe in compensating harms faced due to a sacrifice for the public good or for 
unpreventable incidents that an individual suffers, both of which wrongful conviction are, why 
would we already be doing it? 
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There is an existing belief that we should lift up those in our society who are doing the 
worst off, particularly when they are not at fault. Some might argue that this ideal stems from 
Christianity and others might argue that it stems from a founding principle of opportunity, which 
we recognize as impossible with unfair setbacks and inadequate means. Wherever it comes from, 
there are many existing governmental programs that serve as prime examples that our nation 
holds this ethical foundation to help those in need such as: State Crime Victims Compensation, 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance, and the International Terrorism Victim Expense Program.93 
We currently take part in all of these programs and more because we do not think that people 
should have to suffer consequences for which they are not responsible. Moreover, we think that 
compensation is a moral practice. 
 
 (3) There can be no liability if there is not fault. 
This third argument asserts that the State is not liable for compensation because it was not 
at fault in the wrongful conviction. The State didn’t want to get it wrong and it didn’t do 
anything intentional to produce the wrong outcome, therefore it is not liable. But given the 
numerous systemic problems such as unequal risk, the predictable error rate of around 5%, and 
the clear DNA evidence that disproves guilt, this argument seems unreasonable. 
The State can be seen as in a similar position as a surgeon. Surgeons work hard to get 
positive outcomes, but there are a predictable number of errors.  According to a 2012 article in 
Surgery, “events that should never occur in surgery… happen at least 4,000 times a year in the 
U.S. according to research from Johns Hopkins University.” This includes “at least 39 times a 
week a surgeon leaves foreign objects inside their patients.”94 Surgeons, despite being well 
trained and well intentioned, are required to carry malpractice insurance to compensate the 
victims of these predictable surgical errors.  Why isn’t the State required to carry insurance to 
compensate the victims of predictable errors in their criminal justice system? 
The State’s position of denying liability is made even worse by the unequal risk of error 
faced by those who enter the criminal justice system. Unlike surgery, certain members of society 
have a very small chance of being erroneously convicted, while others, specifically Blacks and 
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Latinos, have a much higher chance of being victimized by error in the courts, Where there is 
consistent predictable error that targets specific groups, it seems difficult to claim there is no 
fault. The State may argue that by being part of society, we take part in an imaginary social 
contract that signs away any insurance that society owes us if they happen to convict us of 
something that we did not do. However, no one would sign such a contract if they knew that they 
were more likelihood to be victimized than their neighbor. 
Moreover, society should want to compensate individuals who are put in this situation. 
Americans are uneasy knowing that their justice system is not only letting off guilty people, but 
perhaps worse, convicting innocent ones. Compensation is a price that the State should pay for 
allowing this to happen—a disincentive to allowing miscarriages of justice. Exoneree 
compensation serves society as a whole in addition to serving the individual who receives it, and 
the more fairly the individual is compensated, the better society can feel about the justice system 
acting—well—just. 
 
A discussion of compensation would not be complete without considering the ethical 
theory known as equality of opportunity. Individuals who are mistakenly put into our criminal 
justice system are dealt a major, unfair setback in their life by being punished for a crime that 
they did not commit. If we take an Equality of Opportunity approach (EO) to their situation we 
would likely agree that these innocent individuals deserve some form of compensation in order 
to get them remotely back to where they might have been had this mistake not occurred. Of 
course, we can never truly pay them back completely. 
In “Justice as Fairness,”95 John Rawls introduces the concept of Independent Rationale—a 
sort of litmus test for determining which justice principles would actually be fair in a society. We 
can use this concept to rationally compare whether we should compensate exonerees or not. The 
Independent Rationale starts off with moral premises that Rawls argues we all already accept to 
be true. First, that the right principles of justice are always binding, in other words moral rules do 
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not suddenly disappear because they are inconvenient,96 and second, that the right principles are 
not those that one party forces on another.97 
Rawls acknowledges that not everyone in our society believes the same thing—why else 
would we have politics? So, in order to find a fair balance among a lot of people who do not 
agree, he introduces a mechanism for coming up with a social contract, a thought experiment 
known as “The Original Position.” He imagines the Original Position (OP) as a hypothetical 
convention where a group of people, “contractors,” must come up with the rules that will govern 
their society. The hypothetical people in the OP are rational, but they are not perfect. Like most 
people, they are self-interested, however, because an individual cannot force others to agree to 
anything that they do not want to agree to, there is going to have to be unanimous agreement 
among the contractors. The final catch is that each individual in the OP is under the “veil of 
ignorance”—they do not know what status they have once the convention is over and they return 
to their lives in the society that they have created. Thus, knowing that they could possibly end up 
with low social status, Rawls argues that the only unanimous decision that the contractors in the 
OP will come to will be to protect those who are worse off in society as much as possible. 
Without getting into a full-blown discussion of equality of opportunity in the US, I can use 
this model to explain why the right principle of justice is to compensate those who are wrongly 
incarcerated. If we look at the OP as a convention to decide how we should treat exonerees we, 
knowing that we could very well enter back into society as a person who is more likely to be 
wrongly convicted than others, would want to provide exonerees with as much support as 
possible, which would likely mean giving them just compensation once they are exonerated. In 
other words, under the constraints of the OP, we would never embrace a society that did not treat 
exonerees well and just because it may sometimes be inconvenient for us to do so, does not mean 
that it is any less moral. 
This argument does not rest on an unequal risk of being wrongful incarcerated. Even if the 
risk were shared equally, the contractors would still not want to be an uncompensated exoneree. 
However, since we know that there is a disparate risk in our society, compensating exonerees is 
arguably even more important. 
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So, if we accept the affirmative answer that that we owe compensation to exonerees, many 
other questions follow: How do we know what we owe an exoneree? What is fair and sufficient 
compensation? What are the options for providing compensation? What are the goals of 
copensation? What are the costs to society? These are the types of questions that I address in the 
next section. 
 
ii. What is Appropriate Compensation? 
   
Since we are unable to give an exoneree the years of their life that they wrongly spent in 
prison back, the best we can do is compensate them with money, services and systematic 
reforms. I have already addressed some of the systematic reforms that should be adopted in order 
to prevent others from suffering the same unjust mistakes that they did, which is why I now 
focus on compensation that is related to money and services. The goals are for society to 
apologize for the wrong that was done and try to make the exoneree’s life as right reasonably 
possible. It’s true that we can probably never offer an individual enough money and services to 
make up for 14 years of their life that we have taken away (not to mention the trauma we have 
caused them), but this does not mean that we should not try to settle on a fair and satisfactory 
compensation.. 
 There are currently three ways for exonerees to gain access to post-release compensation: 
private bills, lawsuits, and statutory compensational parameters. The first of these three options 
is unreliable (they are “dangerously prone to becoming ‘popularity contests’”98) and the second 
is untimely and costly. The third option, built-in state laws that assure compensation, is widely 
accepted by NGOs and scholars alike as the best mechanism to insure that exonerees receive an 
acceptable level of compensation in a reliable and timely manner. Compensation statutes for 
exonerees are also beneficial for states because they create a uniform and predictable policy for 
action. 
Not every State has established compensation parameters for exonerees. In fact, 20 States 
are still without wrongful conviction compensatory statutes, meaning that exonerees in these 
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States are not afforded the right that exonerees in states with these statutes are promised.99 
Furthermore, of the states that have established compensation parameters, the packages that their 
statutes guarantee are extremely variable amongst one another. Thus, in order to decide what 
appropriate compensation is, I will first provide a factual look at the current state of 
compensation in the US. Following this, I will discuss my own proposals which are based on 
achieving three goals: (1) admit there was a wrong done to the exoneree, (2) try to remedy that 
wrong by providing financial resources for an exonoree to establish a new life, and (3) provide 
other services that an exoneree may need upon release. 
While money is a huge part of a compensation package, it is not the only or even the most 
important piece. Instead, it is important that statutes aim to meet these three goals in conjunction 
with one another and that large sums of money are not given out without including assistance in 
handing it.100 
 
Existing Compensation Frameworks in the US 
The federal government has recently updated their compensation framework and have 
encouraged states to do the same. Since 2004, H.R. 5107: The Federal Justice for All Act, grants 
exonerees up to $50,000 per year that they were wrongly incarcerated and $100,000 per year that 
they were on death row.101 This statute has been praised for distinguishing between the negative 
psychological effects that being wrongly sentenced to death has on a person. Previously, Section 
2513(e) of title 28, United States Code had read that the amount of compensation could not 
“exceed the sum of $5,000” period.102 
It is notable that Congress included a statement in The Federal Justice for All Act to 
encourage the States to create just compensation provisions for those wrongfully sentenced to 
death. Section 432 reads: “It is the sense of Congress that States should provide reasonable 
compensation to any person found to have been unjustly convicted of an offense against the State 
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and sentenced to death.”103 While the federal government cannot mandate states to provide 
compensation packages to exonerees, some States have taken up the call. 
 
30 states plus Washington D.C. have adopted compensation statutes for those who have 
been exonerated104 and I will highlight some of the distinct elements that these statutes contain 
so as to better understand the options that states have before them. Perhaps the leading State in 
terms of compensation statutes for wrongfully convicted individuals is Texas, which has been 
commended by the Innocence Project as having the “most generous” compensation statute in the 
country.105 Texas exceeds the federal recommendation. Wrongfully convicted persons are 
entitled to $80,000 per year of wrongful incarceration as an annuity and $25,000 per year that 
they spent on parole or as a registered sex offender.106 Other States offer different less generous 
amounts of monetary compensation to their exonerees. 
California offers a maximum of $140 per day for wrongful incarceration, which includes 
any time spent in custody prior to incarceration,107 while an exoneree from Missouri is only 
eligible for $50 a day for wrongful incarceration.108 If awarded the maximum amount, $50 a day 
would come to $51,100 for a year wrongly spent in prison and thus is at about the Federal 
recommendation. In Maine, “any person with a pardon of innocence is eligible for up to 
$300,000”109 whereas in Tennessee, “any exonerated or pardoned person is entitled to a total of 
$1,000,000 for the entirety of a wrongful incarceration.”110 Thus, we see that states place a wide 
range of “values” on the time that an innocent endured punishment. Some states compensate by 
day and others by year. Some states place maximums while other states have imposed 
minimums. However, what makes Texas’s compensation statute so generous is not only the 
monetary compensation that it awards to exonerees, but the services that it secures. 
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Texas’s statute entitles exonerees to compensation for child support payments, tuition, 
reentry and reintegration services, as well as the option to buy into the Texas State Employee 
Health Plan.111 This serves as a recognition that individuals who are wrongly incarcerated are 
unable to pursue their education and thus, like those who are released after having committed an 
offense, are unprepared for the job market. Additionally, their families have suffered from not 
having them around. Exonerees are also likely to have many health problems upon being 
released as a result of spending so much time in prison living under inadequate health conditions. 
Last, but not least, reintegration is difficult for any person upon being released from prison, but 
exonerees face a specific kind of difficulty as they faced an immense amount of trauma having 
been convicted and punished for a crime they did not commit. 
Texas is not the only state to recognize these important service needs in exonorees’ lives 
once they are granted their freedom. North Carolina’s statute also includes a provision of job 
skills training and education tuition waivers.112 In Vermont, “The exoneree is also eligible for up 
to 10 years of state health care, […] , reimbursement for attorney fees, as well as reasonable 
reintegrative services and mental and physical health care costs incurred by the claimant…”113 
Montana does not provide any monetary compensation. Instead their statute only gives exonerees 
education aid.  
While many of these compensation statutes sound good, there are usually limitations 
written into them. Some of these limitations are stricter than others. It is very common for states 
to include a clause in order to ensure that an individual did not play a role in causing their 
wrongful incarceration. New York’s law specifies that the exoneree is only eligible for 
compensation if he or she “did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction.”114 
Likewise, in order for a claimant to receive compensation for a wrongful conviction they must 
first show that they did not plead “guilty with the specific intent to protect another from 
prosecution for the underlying conviction for which the claimant is seeking compensation.”115 
While these limitations make sense at some level because states are worried that a person could 
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intentionally seek out a wrongful conviction in order to receive these large compensation 
packages, this fear seems unfounded, especially when so many wrongfully incarcerated people 
were coerced to indicate themselves in the crime in the first place. 
Another limitation that some states such as Florida include in their compensation statutes is 
that the exoneree must not have had a prior felony conviction.116 This is an unfair limitation 
since someone who has been previously convicted of a crime are inherently more at risk of being 
wrongfully convicted. 
 
Uniform Compensation vs. Different Rules for Different States 
Clearly, compensation is extremely variable on a state-by-state level, yet the notion of 
receiving extremely different compensation for the same wrong suffered seems unjust. Yes, 
people should be compensated different amounts for different wrongs that they have suffered 
under different circumstances, but if two individuals suffer the same wrong (i.e. are erroneously 
punished in the same way for the same amount of time) and the only discrepancy is that they are 
from different states, this appears to be unequal justice. 
On the other hand, the variability in current state compensation statutes and care packages 
can be seen as reflecting the variability in many State rights and laws, such as the ability to 
smoke marijuana, taxation of income, and the right to marry anyone you choose. Thus, while 
many in innocence projects advocate that all states should have exactly the same compensation 
statutes, I believe it is okay for these statutes to be unique in each state so long.as each state meet 
a certain bar in their compensation statutes for exonerees. The legal system including the right to 
convict and punish is a state right unless it violates a federal law. However, where an issue is 
covered in the Constitution, the Federal government can mandate uniformity. This, I argue, is the 
case when a state’s criminal justice system punishes an innocent individual in a way that is both 
cruel and unusual, violating the Bill of Rights. In this case there should be some minimum 
uniformity mandated by the Federal government to rectify the wrong. This should include a 
minimum level of healthcare needs, financial needs, and legal needs met.117 
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Impact 
Part of understanding appropriate compensation is understanding what the impact of 
wrongful incarceration is on the lives of exonerees. As many scholars, authors and NGOs point 
out, the reality of exonerees post-release is often worse than that of guilty parolees. The 2009 
Innocence Project report Making Up for Lost Time points out that: 
[s]ervices available to parolees in many states, including job placement and 
temporary housing, are not available to exonerees. Upon his release, David 
Shephard sought help from four agencies that provided services to ex-offenders. 
Each agency responded that he could not receive their services since he had not 
committed a crime.118 
 
This is not to say that parolees are especially well treated, but it does seem strange that we would 
provide less support for those who are innocent than for those who are guilty. While this is not 
an intentional action on the part of states, it occurs in certain states because there has not yet 
been a system developed to specialize in helping exonerees. If trends continue and more and 
more innocent individuals are found in the near future, establishing a way to help them back on 
their feet will be crucial. 
Another reason why our society has not done a great job helping exonerees upon their 
release is hypothesized by Kimberely Clow and Amy-May Leach in their 2012 psychological 
study titled, “After Innocence: Perceptions of Individuals Who Have Been Wrongly 
Convicted.”119 Clow and Leach suggest that exonerated individuals face a significant stigma.120 
One might expect that, once their name is cleared, they would be viewed in the same manner as 
anyone else or even treated with more respect, however, they are not. Clow and Leach propose a 
Stereotype Content Model, which suggests that wrongly incarcerated individuals are highly 
stigmatized despite their innocence. The Stereotype Content Model is a model that determines 
perceived level of warmth and perceived level of competence and then places groups of people 
into four different categories based on these levels. Because exonerees are thought of as being 
both low in warmth and competence, society in general seeks to have as much social distance as 
possible from them, seeing them the same way that they would see offenders. This may be one 
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reason why exonerees face low employment opportunities, an important component of 
reintegration.  
Once an individual has been publicly named as a suspect, the internet ensures that their 
reputation is ruined for life. An example is what happened to Mr. Hillary, a wrongfully convicted 
youth whose life was ruined. This led Debora Silberman, a Brooklyn public defender, to publish 
an Op-Ed on the “Brownsville Five.” In it she discussed the sad fate of five African-American 
teenagers who were immediately accused of raping a young woman in a Brooklyn park. The 
prosecutor dropped the charges when it became clear that these five boys, ages fourteen to 
eighteen, were innocent; however, their reputations were ruined. She concludes that: “Naming 
my client and the other boys during the initial public uproar may have been intended to create the 
appearance that the police and prosecutors were taking the case seriously. Their innocence 
should have a greater claim on our conscience.”121 
Of course, feelings such as frustration, mistrust and anger are normal after having been 
illegitimately sentenced. This is especially true since exonerees serve an average of fourteen 
years behind bars.122 Not only can this do psychological damage to a person, but it also takes a 
toll on a person’s physical health. While many see healthcare as a basic human right, prisoners 
tend to be neglected when it comes to medical services, leaving individuals with many lingering 
problems upon release.123 Additionally, while many correctional facilities teach certain skills, 
exonerees, like offenders, come out of prison with a lower level of formal education than their 
peers who were not incarcerated.  
Lastly, exonerees are not given the option to earn a normal (or high paying) salary or save 
money while they are incarcerated and thus are at a huge monetary disadvantage when they are 
released. Thus, we can conclude that satisfactory and fair compensation for exonerees, should 
cover livelihood, health and monetary setbacks. In addition, in order to truly mitigate all these 
unfair impacts on the lives that exonerees lead once they are found to be innocent, there is a need 
for psychological, medical and skills/job placement services for exonerees upon reentry. 
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Finally, who better to ask about effective and ineffective compensation packages than 
exonerees themselves? They know what they wish they would have had upon their release better 
than anyone else. Westervelt and Cook interviewed eighteen exonerated death row survivors and 
were able to compile meaningful recommendations for how to better the US compensation 
system for exonerees. 12 of these survivors were released in or before 2001, a time when there 
was a lot less in place for compensation than there is now. In interviews, these people pointed 
out that their lives had been destroyed “not once, but twice”124 and that they are “angry over [the] 
state’s refusal to help them or… acknowledge them as people who have been wronged.”125 The 
authors concluded that there should be additions to the Innocence Project’s recommendations to 
include using a restorative justice framework, community reintegration forums, abolition of the 
death penalty, and post-conviction state and federal review for all prisoners serving life without 
parole sentences.126. 
When one hears a wrongly convicted person speak, it reminds us of one more 
compensation—perhaps the most important piece of compensation there is—an apology from the 
people who were responsible for the wrongful conviction.127 If made public, this apology not 
only serves to catalyze the victim’s healing process, but also to alleviate societal stigma. In order 
for an exoneree to recover on personal level, it is crucial to recognize that they have experienced 
trauma. Therefore, we need to help them establish their safety, reflect, and reconnect in daily life. 
Yet perhaps surprisingly, what victims most want to see are systematic reforms so that they 
can be confident that others will not have to suffer the same hardships that they did.128 They hope 
to see more funding of public defense offices, doing away with snitch testimony, rethinking the 
immunity of public officials, and abolishing the death penalty.129 It is chilling to hear exonerees 
caring as much about future innocent victims as they care about themselves. Providing an 
apology and expunging an exoneree’s record are the least we can do and are virtually costless. 
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We live in a world with the technology to irrefutably exonerate an individual for a crime 
that they were thought to have committed. With technology like this, some may argue that 
wrongful conviction will soon be a problem of the past. But as Garrett points out, “[p]erhaps the 
cutting-edge science of DNA technology captivates the public. Or perhaps people find it 
surprising that innocence can sometimes, with the benefit of DNA, actually be indisputable, 
making people more suspicious than ever before that our criminal justice system can make 
terrible mistakes” (244). Technology has its limitations, and can even bring about unintended 
consequences. 
Rather than rely on technology, this thesis has pointed out a wide array of issues and 
solution strategies to bring relief to the large number of people who have suffered wrongful 
conviction at the hands of our criminal justice system. Systematic reforms to be considered range 
from abolishing the death penalty to eliminating various types of evidence that are prevalent in 
wrongful conviction cases. More specific strategies would be to encourage the Innocence Project 
and NGOs like it to open their aid offices to cases that do not involve DNA evidence, yet are 
likely cases of wrongful incarceration just the same. 
Currently NGOs, rather than the States, have taken it upon themselves to serve as the 
“exonerators” in wrongful conviction cases. It therefore seems appropriate that the government 
do its job to take on the role of “compensator.” Compensating exonerees in a timely manner and 
in satisfactory and fair ways is not only critical for the lives of the victims, but is also important 
for society itself. The United States cannot claim to value justice as a country that wrongly 
punishes innocent citizens and then turns its back on them when that wrong is irrefutably 
revealed. 
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